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NOTE AND COMMENT

MARITIME Lnms-PERSONALITY oF SHIP.-In Coal .Company v. Fisheries
Company (Advanced Sheets, Nov. IS, 1920), the Supreme Court denies a lien
for supplies of coal furnished the owner of a fleet of vessels for use thereon
and, incidentally, brings into stronger relief the admiralty doctrine of the
personality of the ship as distinguished from that of the owner. At the time
the arrangement was made, the shipowner was without money or credit and
could not enter upon its operations without a supply of coal for its ships and
factories. The Coal Company agreed to supply its requirements on the understanding that, while some of the fuel would be used on shore, the greater
part would be consumed by the vessels and that it wquld have a maritime lien
therefor. All deliveries were made at the shipowner's factories and· the ships
were fueled from its bins in quantities of which accurate accounts were kept.
Towards the close of the season of navigation, the vessels were sold under a
foreclosure of mortgage and. the Coal Company asserted its lien by proceedings iii rem against them. In affirming the decree of the Court of Appeals
dismissing the libels, the Supreme Court points out that the maritime lien
provided by the Act of June 23, I9IO, rests upon a furnishing of supplies to
the vessel and not to the o~vner for such appropriation to the vessel as he
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may subsequently make. The implication is that the relations requisite for
such liens as the statute mentions must be between the creditor and the ship,
not between the creditor and the shipowner, since the ship is "an entity
capable of entering into relations with others, of acting independently, and
of becoming responsible for her acts." Here the material man had furnished
coal to the shipowner but it was the shipowner which had furnished the ship,
so that no maritime lien was created.
Detroit Mich.
G. L. CANFttr.n.
THI~ RIGHT OF A JURY IN A CRIMINAL CASE TO RENDER A VERDICT AGAINST
THE LAW AND THE EvIDENcr:.-One George D. Horning was convicted of the
criminal offense of doing business as a pawnbroker in the District of Columbia without a license. The jury, which rendered the verdict of guilty, were
told by the court, in the course of the charge, that there really was no issue
of fact for them to decide; that the evidence showed a course of dealing constituting a breach of the law, and that they were not warranted in capriciously
saying that the witnesses for the government and for the defendant were not
telling the truth; that it was their duty to accept the exposition of the law
given them by the court; and that while, in a criminal case, the court could
not peremptorily instruct them to find the defendant guilty, if the law permitted it he would do so in this case. The judge concluded his charge as
follows:
"In conclusion I will say that a failure to bring in a verdict in this case
can arise only from a wilful and flagrant disregard of the evidence and the
law as I have given it to you and a violation of your obligation as jurors.
Of course, gentlemen, I cannot tell you in so many words to find defendant
guilty, but what I say amounts to that."
On a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of the United States, it
was held by Justices Holmes and four concurring judges that there was no
error in these instructions. Justice Brandeis and three other judges dissented. This was the case of Horning v. District of Columbia, 41 Sup. Ct.
Rep. 53, decided November 22, 1920.
Justice Holmes said that the judge could not direct a verdict of guilty,
for "the Jury has the power to bring in a verdict in the teeth of both law and
facts", but that he had not really done so in this case, for "the jury were
allowed the technical. right, if it can be so called, to decide against the law
and the facts."
Justice Brandeis said that in his opinion the charge of the court amounted
to a "moral command", and was as much the direction of a verdict as though
made "in so many words."
What the trial judge did in this case was, in effect, to inform the jury
that it was their c!ttty as jurors, under the oath which they had taken, to find
the defendant guilty on the undisputed facts and on the law which he had
laid down, but that he could not take any steps to compel them to do their
duty further than to urge them to do it. Here was a duty, then, which could
not be enforced, and a breach of which could not be punished. Did it fol-
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low that the duty to find the defendant guilty was only a moral, not a legal,
duty, and that therefore the jury, while morally bound, were legally free?
In the leading case of Sparf and Hansen v. United States, 156 U. S. 51,
it was admitted by all the jud_ges that the jury had the power to go against
the law as laid down by the court, but the majority held that they had no
legal right. to do this, while the minority argued with great skill and learning
that they had both the power and the legal right. In the Horning case the
majority held that the jury had the power and were allowed the technical
right to go against the law and the evidence, and therefore there was no error.
Is it to be concluded from this that the court has shifted away from the rule
so laboriously worked out in the Sparf and Hansen case, and has come to
recognize the right of the jury to decide the law?
If Justice HolII).es meant by "technical right" a real legal right, his view
is not in accord with the Sparf and Hansen case. But he does not seem to
have meant this. He says "the jury were allowed the technical right, if it can
be so called, to decide against the law and the facts." What happened was
that the jury were given the opportunity to use their power to do this, but
were told that they ought not to do it. They were not told that they could not
do it. The juqge made it clear that while their duty was to convict, there was
no agency for enforcing that duty except their own consciences. This might
seem to indicate that the duty was a· merely moral duty, and that while they
had a legal right to ignore the judge's instructions they had no moral right
to do so. But the law deals with legal, not moral concepts, and if the court,
as a. court of law, could properly say that it was their duty to follow his
views, that duty must have been a legal duty. There is nothing incongruous
in a legal duty which the law does not or cannot enforce. Its unenforceable
character does not relegate it to the realm of morality. There are many
instances of imperfect legal rights, where the customary union between the
right and its enforcement by legal action has been for some special reason
severed, and where the maxim ubi jus ibi remediitm does not apply. SALMOND,
JURISPRUDENCE, Sec. 78. Claims against sovereign states are outstanding examples. One may perhaps get a judgment against the state, but there is
usually no means of positive enforcement of that judgment. But the claims
should properly be deemed legal, not merely moral.
Holland says that jurisprudence is specifically concerned only with such
rights as are recognized by law and enforced by the power of the state.
JuRISPRUDtNCE [12th ed.], 82. But this is too broad a statement. As Dicey
points out, "The distinction between the recognition and the enforcement of
a right deserves notice. A court recognizes a right when for any purpose the
court treats the right as existing. * * * But our courts constantly recognize
rights which they do not enforce." CONFLICT oF LAWS [2nd ed.], 31. 32. The
statute of limitations, as shown by Salmond, does noi: extinguish a debt,
thereby destroying the right, but merely prevents an action for its recovery.
The right remains "for all purposes save that of enforcement." JunrsPRUDENCE. Sec. 78.
Now, the court held in the Sparf and Hansen case tha_t the legal right to
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determine the law was in the court. But while the judiciary recognizes this
right it does not enforce it. It recognizes it as a means for influencing, not
for controlling, the action of the jury. The right exists for a legitimate legal
purpose, but that purpose is not enforcement. The right is therefore an imperfect legal right, or a right subject to a procedural limitation. And when
Justice Holmes, in Horning's case, says that the jury have a "technical right"
to go against the law and the facts, he seems to be merely pointing out this
imperfection which the law recognizes in the right of the court to determine
the law. The "technical right" of the jury is only the restriction placed upon
the right of the court. To say that the court has the right to determine the
law but that the jury have the technical right to disregard it, appears to be
only another way of saying that the court has the right to determine the law
but has no means of enforcing its right against the jury.
If this was the situation in which the law placed the judge and the jury,
it was incumbent upon the trial judge to explain it to the jury and not to
mislead them by claiming not only the right to determine the law, which he
had, but also the right of enforcement, which he did not have. The judge
did explain this to the jury. He told them that it was their legal duty to find
the defendant guilty, but that he was not permitted by the law to compel them
to perform that duty. He made it sufficiently clear that their duty was imperfect in its obligation and was unenforceable by the court. This was
entirely consistent with the case of Spar/ and Hanse1i.
Justice Brandeis disapproved of the action of the trial court because he
believed it amounted to a moral command to convict the defendant. If there
was error here, the fault lay, not in telling the jury that they ought to convict, but in failing to make it perfectly clear that the law left the performance or non-performance of this legal duty wholly to the conscience of the
jury. In other words, the moral command, if there was one, consisted in the
failure to disclose the unenforceable and imperfect character of the duty to
follow the law as given by the court. It was at most a moral advantage
taken Ly the court resulting from an incomplete and misleading statement
of the nature of the legal duty resting upon the jury,-the same sort of
moral compulsion which frequently flows from incomplete instructions. But
there is nothing in this dissenting opinion, any more than in the prevailing
opinion, which conflicts with the Spar/ and Hansm case.
E. R. S.
CITY PLANN1xo-LocATION oF STREETS A!-:D EsTAm.1sHMf.XT oF Buu.mx•~

Lmes.-In 1917, Connecticut, by law authorized Windsor to create a town
planning commission "to make surveys and maps, section by section * *
showing locations for any public buildings, highways, or streets, including
street building and veranda lines." Such map was to be filed in the town
clerk's office, and notice given to the owners for a hearing; after such hearing, the commission was to decide, and file a map in accord with its decision;
a right of appeal to court was reserved to an aggrieved party; and no street
was to be opened until the land necessary was appropriated under eminent
domain proceedings. A town planning commission was appointed, and made
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plans, under this. statute. The defendant, in developing a tract of land for
r~sidential purposes, in Windsor, laid out streets, fixed building lines, and
began selling lots, without conforming to the commission plans. The city
sued to restrain him from proceeding according to his own plans. He demurred on. the ground that the act authorized a taking of his property without
due process of law. The trial court so held. On appeal, reversed. Town
of Windsor v. Whitney, (Conn., Aug. 5, 1920), III Atl. 354
Wheeler, J., speaking for the majority, says: "This does not physically
take the land, but it regulates its use, and hence deprives the owner of a part
of his dominion over his land. The owner may not lay out streets through
this land where he chooses and of the width he chooses. Nor may he establish the building lines where he wills. There is no provision in the act for
compensation. * * * Unless this regulation can be supported as a legitimate
exercise of the police power the act must fall. A town commission plan * * *
is distinctly for the public welfare. * * * In such a plan each street will be
properly related to every other street. Building lines will be established where
the demands of the public require. Adequate space for light and air will be
given. Such a plan is a wise ,Provision for the future. It betters the safety
and health of .the community; it betters the transportation facilities; and it
adds to the appearance and wholesomeness of the place, and as a consequence
it reacts upon the morals and spiritual power of the people who live under
such surrouqdings."
Gager, J., dissented, holding that the establishment of a building line was
a taking of property for which compensation must be made, relying on and
citing City of St. Louis v. Hill, n6 Mo. 527; Northrop v. Waterbury, 81
Conn. 309; Benedict v. Pettes, 85 Conn. 537. And this seems to be according
to the weight of authority: E11ba11k v. Richmond, (1912), 226 U. S. 137, Ann.
Cas. l914B, 192, with note; Fruth v. Board of Affairs, (1915), 75 W. Va. 456.
It was only in reference to the building line provisions that Judge Gager
dissented. The case therefore stands for the rule that a city may lay out
streets over or across the land of another, and the land owner must conform to such lay-out, in disposing of his lots, although the city has not opened
the street, and may not do so for a long time. In this particular it resembles
the early case of In the Matter of F1m11an Street (1836), 17 Wend., N. Y.,
649. Here the legislature of New York authorized the vil!age of Brooklvn
to lay out streets and file a map thereof. It did so in 1819. In 1833, one of
the streets so laid out was first opened; in the meantime buildings had been
erected within the street as originally mapped, and it was held the owner was
not entitled. to any compensation for the destruction of his building when the
street was actually opened seventeen years after its location. This case, however, was overruled by the Court of Appeals, in Forster v. Scott, (1882) 136
N. Y. 577, 583, and this was followed on a similar state of facts in Edwards
v. Bruorto11, (1904), 184 Mass. 529, 532.
Pennsvlvania, on the other hand, early followed the Furma1i St. case,
and conti;ues to do so: fa Forbe; Street, (1871), 70 Pa. St. 125, 137; Bush
v. llfrKeesport, (1895), 166 Pa. 57; Harriso1i's Estate, (1915), 250 Pa. 129;
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Philadelphia Parkway, (1915), 250 Pa. 257; Dintman v. Cit)• of Harrisbiirg,
(1919), - - Pa.--, 108 Atl. 724, 725.
Sec for full discussion of recent cases on zoning, 19 MrcH. L. ~v. 191.

H.L.W.
CONCURRENT PowtR UNDER THE EIGHTEENTH AMENDMENT.-The two
main questions which have been considered in making the decisions under the
Eighteenth Amendment are whether or not state provisions for referendum of
legislative action can be applied to ratification of proposed amendments to
the Federal Constitution, Hawke v. Smith, (1920), 251 U. S. - - , 40 Sup.
Ct. 495, and what the interpretation of the second section of the amendment
is to be, in giving the states 'concurrent power' to enforce the Amendment by
legislation, along with Congress. State of Rhode Island v. Palmer, (1920),
40 Sup. Ct. 486. Hawke v. Smith reversed the decision (below) in the Ohio
Supreme Court, 126 N. E. 400, which had held that the referendum applied.
See note on the decision in the Ohio court in 18 MICH. L. ~v. 6g8. The
Supreme Court decided that the fifth Article of the Constitution, providing
for methods of amendment, is a grant of authority by the people to Congress;
hence, the authority given to the state legislatures to ratify is given to specific
bodies as an expression of assent, rather than legislative action, so that the
referendum cannot apply. See a forecast of this view in a Note and Comment
in 18 MICH. L. ~v. 51. Davis v. Hildebrant, 24I u. s. 565, which held that
the referendum provision of the state constitution applied to a law redistricting the state with a view to representation in Congress was distinguished on
the ground that that was legislative action by the state, to which the referundum properly applied. For an exposition of the cases of Hawke v. Smith
and Rhode Isla11d v. Palmer, supra, see article by Thomas R. Powell, "Constitutional Law in r91g-1920," 19 MrcH. L. Rev., pp. 2-8. On the Eighteenth
Amendment as a whole, see article Qy George D. Skinner, "Intrinsic Limitations on the Power of Constitutional Amendment," 18 MrcH. L. REV. 213.
In Rhode Island v. Palmer, the opinion of the Court gave no reasons for
the decision, setting a new precedent in giving practically a memorandum
opinion in a case of wide importance. It held that the words 'concurrent
power' do not mean joint power, nor that legislation by Congress must be
approved by the states, nor that the power should be divided between Congress and the several states along the lines of activity in inter and intra-state
commerce regulations.
Justice McKenna, in a separate opinion, interprets section 2 of the Amendment to mean 'coincident or united action'; there must be concordant action
in Congress and the states, and he looks hopefully to the sentiment which
produced the Amendment to give harmonious legislation in Congress and the
states. The giving of concurrent p'Ower to both Congress and the states expressly is entirely new in the Constitution. Any argument must necessarily
be based on more or less remote analogy. Perhaps concordant action as
demanded by Justice McKenna is possible. In Ex parte Siebold, 100 U. S.
371, at page 391, Justice Bradley, in discussing the power given to the states
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to prescribe election laws, and that of Congress to make or alter them, says
"the more general reason assigned, to-wit, that the nature of sovereignty is
such as to preclude the joint cooperation of two sovereigns even in a matter
in which they are mutually concerned, is not, in our judgment, of sufficient
force to prevent concurrent an·d. harmonious action on the part of the national
and state "governments in the election of representatives. It is at most an
argument ab i11co11ve11ie11te." Of course, the provision that Congress can
alter regulations makes it paramount over the states. And see Sow/es v.
TVitters, 46 Fed. 4991 where a United States statute authorized Federal Courts
to adopt judgment remedies of the state in which it is located, and that such
then become United States Laws. A difficulty of adjustment, however, if
concordant action is required, is indicated in Boston & M. R. R. v. U. S.,
265 Fed. 578, in which it was contended that a Federal statute on taxing of
corporations should get its inter.pretation of certain words from the state
statute on the subject. It was said that if this principle were accepted, "the
general government would be forced to adopt different standards and differini;
rules of taxation among the states, varying in accordance with the differing
statutes." The objection of Justice White, however, that to require concurrent action is to practically nuilify the Amendment, since until such action is
taken prohibition is a dead letter, seems unanswerable.
The Chief Justice, objecting both to a requirement of concordant action
and to Congress' being paramount, where they both act, seems to hold that
Congress and the states have independent powers. The cases before the Court
in the Rhode Island decision were cases of injunctions against the enforcement of the Volstead Act, passed by Congress in accordance with section 2.
Two cases came up subsequently to the Rhode Island decision, one in a
Federal District Court, E.i· partc Ra111sa)•, 265 Fed. 950 (Fla.); and Co111111011wcalth v. Nic/{crson, 128 N. E. 273 (Mass.), on indictmr.nts ur.der state
statutes which had been passed before the Volstead Act. In both cases it
was held that the fact that the state statutes antedated the Volstead Act made
no difference in the situation, and in both cases the indictments were sustained. In E:r parte Ra111sa;y, supra, the indictments were under a statu~c
passed to enforce a state constitutional prohibition provision. It was held
that since the state statute made 5ubstantially the same thing unlawful that
the Volstead Act did. there was no conflict, although the penalties provided
by the state act were more severe than those provided by the Federal Act.
"Surely a state could pass legislation for the purpose of carrying out the
Amendment under the authority given in the Amendment itself, which was not
in violation.of any provisions of the Volstead Act." It would seem to follow
that if the statute had been in violation of the Volstead Act, it would have
fallen. In Co111111011wcalth v. Nickerson, sitpra, Chief Justice Rugg gives an
· exhaustive discussion of the possibilities of concurrent action. The defendant
was charged with selling liquor without a license, contrary to the provisions
of the state statute. The question was as to the validity of the statute since
the Eighteenth Amendment and the Volstead Act. It was held that so much
of it as allowed sales under a license fell after the Amendment, but th;it the
rest of the statute was enforceable, since it did not conflict with the Volstead
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Act; that powers of the state and of Congress may be given different manifestations if not in collision with one another, in which case state legislation
must yield; and a state statute could not authorize what Congress forbids.
These decisions seem sound, and seem to avoid any suggestion of a 'states'
rights' interpretation. Justice Rugg discards the meaning of 'concurrent' as
given in cases between states exercising concurrent jurisdiction over the river
running between them; W eddillg v. M eyler, 192 U. S. 573; Neilson v. Oregon,
212 U. S. 315. The latter case held that an act done on the river within the
boundaries of one state and allowed by that state cannot be prosecuted by the
other state. Justice McKenna found an analogy here for action under the
Eighteenth Amendment; but one outst:inding difficulty seems to be that 5tat~s
arc equal powers, while the United States and any one state can scarcely be
held to be equal sovereignties. Moreover, Justice Brewer in the latter case
said that the object of giving concurrent jurisdiction was to avoid nice questions as to whether a criminal act sc•ught to be prosecuted was committed on
one side or the other of the river; it was expressly not decided whether, in
the entire absence of legislation by one state the other could enforce its statute
anywhere on the river, nor whether prosecution must be by both state5 jointly.
The Rhode Island decision expressly held that 'concurrent power' did not
mean that power divided between Congress and the states along lines which
separate interstate commerce from intrastate affairs; yet cases concerning this
division furnish a helpful analogy. in concurrent power. Chicago. Milwaukee
& St. Paul R. Co. v. Solan, 169 U. S. 133; Lake Shore & Mich. Southern R.
Co. v. Oh'o, 173 U. S. 285; see Ric!z111011d & A. R. Co. v. R. A. Pattrrs-m
Tobacco Co., 169 U. S. 3II. In Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co. ''· Ohio. supra,
Justice Harl<>n said, "This power in the states is entirely distinct from any
power granted to the general government, although, when exercised, it may
sometimes re3.ch subjects over which national legislation can be constitutionally extended." G:Z111a1i v. Philadelphia, 3 Wall. 713, recognizes concurrent
power in the states in all cases except where power is exclusively in the
Federal Constitution, expressly prohibited to the states, and where in the
nature of things it must be exercised by the national government exclusively.
The building of a bridge across a navigable river was held to be within this
reserved power of the state. Where Congress has not controlled state legislation in this field, the state, within certain limits, is supreme. Willson v. Blackbird Creek Mars/I Co .. 2 Pet. 245. Where the powers clash, Congre>s is paramount, Sinnot v. Davenport, 22 How. 227. It would seem that the Eighteenth
amendment has given the states further power than they have in their reserved police powers touching interstate commerce; in that they have power
over importations. But this seems to be more a difference of degree than
of kind, and an analogy seems possible.
One difficulty seems to lie in the fact that 'concurrent' is assumed to mean
the same thing as 'equal.' That it does not mean that is tacitly recognized in
Ex parte Ramsay and Commonwealth v. Nickerson, s11pra. To waive completely the analogy found in the cases where states have exercised their reserve powers, 'concurrent' at least in a sense, simply because "the analogy is
not perfect, seems a species of legalistic reasoning. It was undoubtedly meant

332

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

by the second section of the Amendment to make the enforcement of it as
effective as possible, by giving the states concurrent power. It is not conceivable that it was intended to assert anew a 'states' rights' doctrine. In
cases in which, heretofore, tqe states have had reserved powers, Congress,
where it ip.vades those powers,. where permitted to enter the field, .has been
considered_paramount, and it is doubtful if the framers cf the Amendment
-intended to break away from this precedent and make the power of the
states equal to that of Congress, although independent. It would seem that
there must be a clear repugnancy where the principle of supremacy·is applied;
see Simio1i v. Davenport, sz'pra, at page 243. Not to hold Congress supreme
in case of a clash would certainly nullify the amendment. The two decisions
supra of E~ parte Ramsey and Commonwealth v. Nickerson seem to have
pointed the way which interpretation is bound to take.
G. D. C.

